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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WALTER E. MULLINS,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 14407

vs.
RALPH M. EVANS and ROYAL
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION; INC.,
a California corporation,
Defendants and
Appellants.

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING

RELIEF SOUGHT ON RE-HEARING
Respondent seeks relief from the Courtfs opinion reversing
the juryfs findings and verdict of liability entered herein.

It

appears to the respondent that the Court has either overlooked
some of the evidence adduced at the trial or has misconstrued
some of the facts in the case, thereby resolving the issues of
fact in favor of appellants and against respondent contrary to
the jury's findings.

It is respectfully submitted that the long-

standing rule of law of this Court is to the effect that the
prevailing party at the trial level is entitled to a construction
of the facts most favorable to the jury's findings, together
with all inferences flowing therefrom.

Respondent respectfully
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submits that the Court has failed to follow this rule in its
opinion heretofore rendered in the respects as will be set forth
in this Petition.
A literal reading of the Courtfs opinion leads one to
believe that the law in this State now deprives a corporate
creditor of any standing to enforce his claim against a purchaser
of the debtor corporation unless he can show that the purchasing
corporation knew of the outstanding obligation.

On page 3 of

the Courtfs opinion, the last paragraph thereof, this Court stated
unequivocally that the plaintiff and respondent herein was in no

<

better standing with his claim than someone with an unrecorded
mortgage on a piece of machinery which had been sold for value.
Respondent fails to correlate the Courtfs analogy of respondent's
claim as it may be related to a chattel mortgagee

The statutes

of the State of Utah clearly provide methods by which a person
may record a chattel mortgage to preserve his rights.

<

There is

no method by virtue of statute known to respondent to preserve
a claim for commissions as set forth in plaintifffs complaint.
There simply appears to be no recording protection available to
the plaintiff herein.
The Court also states in the next to last paragraph on
page 3 of its opinion that there might be or would be a contingent
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•

liability on the part of defendant, Royal Industries1 purchase
of the Evans Corporation if it could be shown that
f!

Royal Industries knew or had any reason to know
that Mro Mullins would claim a commission on
machines which it would manufacture and sell.11
The testimony taken at the time of trial and which will

be set forth verbatim shows that there was ample; reason and opportunity for the purchasing corporation, Royal, to know or acquaint
itself with the obligations of the selling corporation.

If the

Court, in its opinion, is saying that a purchaser of a corporation,
assets and obligations, may overlook, through its own negligence
or otherwise, an obligation and thereby avoid the same, it would
then place the creditors of the selling corporation in an impossible situation.

How simple it would be for the seller and purchaser

to both state at the time of trial that neither had discussed the
obligation or considered the same in the transaction, thereby avoiding responsibility and defeating a creditor!s claim0

It is

respectfully submitted that the substance of the transaction should
be considered, together with the testimony, and not merely the form
of the writingo

The test should be whether or not the purchasing

corporation had a reasonable opportunity to acquaint itself with
the obligations of the seller and whether or not, through its own
inadvertence or neglect, it failed to do so.

To reason otherwise

would promote dishonesty between buyer and seller to the detriment
of creditors.

The record clearly shows by the testimony of defend-
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ant, Ralph Evans, that the records of Mullins1 claim were avail
able and very possibly could have been reviewed by the purchase
accountants and attorneys0

He testified as follows:

f,

Q0

And the fact of the matter is the minute you
sent Mr 0 Mullins that notice that you weren't
going to give him any more money and gave him
a check to settle up what you thought you were
going to give him any more money and gave him
a check to settle up what you thought you were
going to be able to terminate the agreement,
he immediately wrote back with a letter within
a matter of a couple of weeks, didnft he; told
you he wasn't the least bit satisfied and told
you he wasn't going to sit still for it?

"A.

He did not say he wouldn't accept it. Accepted
the check and cashed the check.

"Q.

Of course, because you owed him the money. He
also wrote you and told you that he wasn't satisfied and that he considered it an agreement
and he didn't think you were the kind that you
weren't going to live up to your word, didn't
he, in his letter?

ff

He wrote down that he wasn't satisfied but he
accepted the check and he cashed the check and
in the letter, in my letter I stated to him
that this was payment in full for all his services rendered to R. M. Evans Company and
Evans Manufacturing Companyc

,f

And you said it was your word that was at stake
in his letter?

"A.

Pardon?

ff

He said it was your word that was at stake, that
you made the agreement and it was your word that
was at stake, didn't he?11 (Testimony of Ralph
Evans, TR 949 to 950.)

A.

Q.

Q.

4
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Evans further testified that when the representatives of
Royal came to his company to go over their records to formulate
their merger agreement, Evans made all records available for
their examination.
fl

Q.

fl

A0

He stated:

When Evans,
was it your
had access,
Mr 0 Mullins

when the Royal people came over,
understanding that they knew or
had access to the data about
and the agreement?

Yes, sir, they had access to it. Yes, sir."
(R 964.) (Emphasis suppliedo)

He further testified:
M

Q. Where was that information and that material
pertaining to Mr. Mullins; was it in your
files downstairs?

,f

A.

We had a set of files, had a file cabinet,
files and they1re all marked by the different companies we deal with, and everybody
had total access to them, and when they made
the survey and things, while the accountants
were there, why they went through all the
fileSo" (R 971o) (Emphasis supplied0)

Evans admitted in his testimony that within about two weeks
after he wrote his letter to Mullins, terminating, or at least
attempting to terminate his agreement to pay commissions, that
Mullins immediately responded within two weeks with a letter
setting forth that he did not agree to the unilateral cancelation
of their written agreement.

The jury also so found the facts to

be as claimed by Mullins, namely, that he was not accepting the
check from Evans as a complete satisfaction of all obligations
owed to him under the agreemento

Nevertheless, the Court, in its

by the Howard
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clarkto
Law School,
opinion, setsDigitized
forth
thatW. Evans
testified
the BYU.
effect that he
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

thought there was nothing further to be done since, in his opinion, he thought that Mullins had accepted his check and there
was no further claim that would be made by Mullins.

This is

simply contrary to the evidence and the juryfs findings.

See

Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, which is Mullins1 letter sent to Evans
within two weeks after his attempted cancelation of the agreement setting forth that he was not accepting the unilateral
cancelation.

How on earth the Court could feel that Evans

had any justifiable reason to consider the agreement with Mullins
as canceled is not justified by the evidence and the jury's findEvans acknowledged receiving Mullins1 letter but

ings.

apparently chose to ignore Mullins1 claim because of his sale to
Royal.

In any event, the jury specifically found that Mullins

did not agree to the unilateral termination of the commission
agreement.
The Court's opinion apparently chose to disregard the jury
findings in favor of respondent and has selected a self-serving
statement of defendant, Evans, to the effect that he had decided
that Mullins had no further claim.

The uncontroverted evidence

further shows by testimony of Evans as follows:
M

Q.

When you sold the corporate assets of the
R. M. Evans Company to the Royal Industries,
did you discuss with anybody from Royal
Industries that you had written documents
or letters to Mr. Mullins giving him some
sort of an interest in the commissions or
profits of your company?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lf

A#

It was never specifically discussed, I don't
think. They had access to all records from
the time the company was formed and they had
their own accountants, plus Price & Waterhouse,
who reviewed all the legal documents and
accounting records from inception0

n

Q.

Do you know whether or not Royal Industries
were aware of or saw your letter to Mr. Mullins
of August 23rd, 1968, wherein you indicate his
share of the 52 EZY-Bond Pinch Roller Machines
that were sold at $1,211.60 and indicating that
his XL commission on the net profit -of the R. M.
Evans Manufacturing Company to March 31, 1967
indicated $389.80--do you know whether or not
this correspondence or copies of it were available to the Royal Industries when they purchased
all of the assets of your company?

,f

A.

It was available to them, yes0ff
(Emphasis supplied.)

(R 761 and 762.)

It should also be kept in mind that at the time of trial,
Evans testified on behalf of all defendants*

The record does

not indicate in any respect that his testimony was to be binding
only upon himself.
He further testified:
"Q.

What investigations to your knowledge were
made by Royal Industries as to the financial
condition of the two corporations?

ff

There was a couple of the top executives of
Royal Industries, and examined the records0

"Q*

Who would that be?

f,

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Freedman0

Ao

Ae

7
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,f

What is their position?

"A.

Mrc Johnson is the President of Royal
Industries and Mr c Freedman is Vice
President in Charge of Finance,

"Qo

0kayo

,f

And they come in and reviewed the records, "
the premises, the operation, and then in
turn we arrived at an agreement in principle
and they called in Price, Waterhouse, who is
the national CPA firm which does all of the
auditing for Royal Industries, and they come
in and took a certified audit of the operations o

,f

Did the Royal Industries people examine the
books of the two companies?

ff

A0

Yes, sir, they dido

M

Q.

Did they discuss the books and financial
affairs of the two companies with the
accountant for the two companies?

Q.

Ao

Q.

"A.

And what occurred?

Yes, sir, they did."

(R 899 and 900.)

The record is amply clear that commissions were being paid
to Mullins and that there was correspondence in the company records
and files, together with obvious records indicating that Mullins
was receiving a commission on all machines being soldo

These

records were undeniably available to be seen and examined had
they been properly reviewed.

Apparently, no one from Royal asked

Evans for additional information concerning the Mullins agreement
and evidently, from the lack of evidence in the record, no one
from Royal has ever claimed that the records were concealed.
record is totally silent on any such claim.

The only logical
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The

conclusion which may be drawn from the evidence is that the
records were there to be seenc

In regard to the review of the

records by the accountants and officers of Royal, Mr c Freedman,
as Vice President of Royal Industries, testified he was a
Certified Public Accountant and that he, among others, had reviewed the Evans Company records before entering into the
agreement to purchase both companies.

He admitted that the

negotiations involved the liabilities of the Evans Companies as
well as the assets and that these were considered in the purchase
price.

(R 909.)
Mr G Freedman testified as follows:

ff

Qo

And you, also as far as you knew and what
Mr. Evans revealed to you through these
companies, you, were buying all the obligations and seeing that they were taken care
of, too, whatever was disclosed?

!f

We had no reason, yes, we had no reason to
believe that all of the obligations that the
company had were not disclosed to us, and
those were the obligations that we were
assuming.

f,

So as far as Royal was concerned you thought
you were being fully informed of all assets
and obligations and that you were buying all
of those?

,f

That is rightoff

A0

Q0

A0

(R 909o)

It is clear from the testimony of Mrc Freedman that Royal
Industries intended to accept and thought they were getting all
of the liabilities of the Evans Companies except those enumerated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

specifically in the agreement as being reservedo

He also indicated

in his testimony that they thought they were getting all of the
obligations as disclosed by the company records. Whether or not
the accountants reviewed the records properly is not an issue in
this case.

The Court has clearly pointed out in its main opinion

that if there was reason for Royal to have knowledge of the obligation, there might be liability.

Certainly, from the records,

there is reason to know of the claim of Mullins if the records
had been reviewed as the parties claim they did.
Freedman clearly testified that his company, Royal Industries,
thought they were getting all of the liabilities other than those
set forth in Exhibit D-45, the merger agreement*,

In fact, he testi-

fied that certain funds were being withheld in escrow to cover a
contingency that they had overlooked some of the debts or obligations of Evans Companies.

In referring to the agreement between

Evans Companies and Royal, Mr. Freedman was asked:
f,

To your knowledge, Mr. Freedman, is there anything in the document that requires MrD Evans
to reimburse your company, the Royal Industries,
for any undisclosed liabilities that you have
to become liable for in this action?

ff

I believe that there was a period of time after
the agreement was executed, a part of the consideration that we paid to him was set aside in
an escrow for any, I think it was two years, if
I am not mistaken, for any liabilities that we
would have become responsible for that were unknown at the time the deal was made0" (R 925
to 9260) (Emphasis supplied.)

Q0

A0
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This law suit in question was filed within that two-year
period as is evidenced by the complaint on file he ^ inc
The record again clearly shows that Royal Industries intended to take all of the obligations except those enumerated in
the agreement as being specifically withheld or exempt from the
agreemento

There were even provisions for escrow of funds to

cover any obligations which might have been overlooked*,
If a generous approach to the facts is taken and it is
merely alleged that the parties to the agreement, namely, the
defendants herein, had overlooked the Mullins obligation, it
would still have been an obligation of the Royal Industries as
contemplated by its purchase agreement with the Evans Companies0
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence simply does
not support the Courtfs findings that there was no proof that
Royal Industries
"knew or had any reason to know"
that Mullins would claim a commission on his machines. Mullins1
immediate reply to Evans denouncing his attempt to cancel the
agreement, as is evidenced by his letter heretofore designated
"as Exhibit P-6, which clearly shows the same0
such a finding of facto

The jury also made

A review of the records and any reason-

able inquiry which might have been made by Royal, had it contacted
Mr« Mullins, would have obviously revealed his claim0

Since no

one claims that the information concerning the contract with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mullins was withheld from Royal, it can only logically be inferred
that they saw the agreement and failed to heed its meaning or
through their own inadvertence, overlooked the sameQ

In either

instance, they should not be relieved of responsibility0

It is

clear that their own agreement intended to make provision for
any eventuality, such as an overlooked debt which might arise0
In any event, Royal's failure to make provisions for the Mullins
claim was brought about by their fault, not Mullins0
This Courtfs opinion, on page 3, paragraph 4 thereof,
further states as follows:
ff

As a part of the sale, the purchaser agreed to
assume all debts and liabilities of the selling
corporation.fl

The fact that MrG Freedman of Royal disclaimed any personal
knowledge of the obligation certainly does not negate the evidence
that the information was there to be seen.

It also does not

nullify the terms of the agreement wherein special escrow provisions were made to cover such eventualities as an overlooked
obligation.

The records were certainly there to be seen as is

shown by the uncontradicted evidence.
This Court then states in its opinion at the conclusion
of the same as follows:
ff

If anybody owed any obligation to Mr 0 Mullins,
it was the R, Mc Evans Company, IncG but that
company was not made a party to this action,,11
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It is respectfully pointed out that at the time of the
bringing of this suit, there was no company in existence named
R. M. Evans Company, Inc. who could respond in damages in any
event.

The facts and evidence clearly show that the only thing

remaining of the Evans Corporations at the conclusion of their
agreement with Royal were the corporate books. All of the
corporate stock of the Royal Corporation given*to the Evans
Companies as payment for the purchase of the company was required to be immediately disbursed to the stockholders and a
liquidation of the companies had to be brought about as soon as
possiblec
This Court also said in its opinion that in any event if
the R. M. Evans Company did not make any further machines, the
agreement with Evans would have been in essence worthless because
he would have no commissions coming.

In one breath, the opinion

says we should have sued the Evans Company after the sale to
Royal for commissions but then states that if Evans Company did
not make any further machines, we have nothing coming.

It would

seem that what the Court's opinion is saying, in substance, is
that either way Mr. Mullins was to turn, he is left without a
remedyo

In other words, the person or corporation having con-

tracted to pay the obligation could assign it to someone else
and thereby both parties avoid any responsibility under the agreement.

This seems totally unsupported by logic or law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As is indicated by the Court's own opinion, a law suit
against Evans Companies after the acquisition of the companies
by Royal would have produced, at best, a judgment with about as
much value as a "Gerald Ford Button0,f
The law should be and respondent believes still is to the
effect that acquisition agreements as evidenced by the testimony

I

in this case and Exhibit D-45 should be reviewed as to their
substance, not just merelyas to form. In reference to said
Exhibit, it is captioned at the top of the first page
"Closing Documents Royal Industries, Inc0
Acquisition of R. Mc Evans & Company, Inc.
and Ralph Evans Manufacturing Company, Inc0lf
The plan of reorganization as the agreement is referred
to on page 1

of the Exhibit clearly sets forth that the intent

is to acquire all, or at least substantially all of the assets
of the Evans Companies0

The agreement states on page 1 thereof

,f

..«and the assumption by Royal of substantially
all of the corporations1 liabilities0ff
In paragraph 2 of page 13 of Exhibit D-45, it again

clearly indicates that it was contemplated that the stock being
given to Evans Companies by virtue of the acquisition was to be
immediately distributed to the stockholders and a liquidation
was to take place of the companies0

What difference in sub-

stance is there to such an agreement as compared to some of the
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more formal requirements in mergers that the stocks be given
directly to stockholders?

A provision that the stock go to the

corporation with a mandatory requirement of immediate distribution to stockholders accompanied by a liquidation of the
corporation appears to accomplish exactly the same resulto

The

only distinguishing feature might be the tax consequences to the
parties involved.

This should not have a bearing on claims made

by creditorso
On page 29 of the Merger Agreement, Article IX, it is
captioned as follows:
"Liquidation of Corporation 9.1c The Corporation
further agrees that promptly after the closing
date, the Corporation shall file all necessary,
documents for the Secretary of State of the
State of Arizona to liquidate the Corporation,
and to distribute to its shareholders all
shares of the common stock of Royal received by
Corporation and then available for distribution
on a pro rata basis. The Corporation shall be
obligated immediately to change the name of the
Corporation to a name agreed to by Royal0n
In the Merger Agreement, the Evans Companies were referred
to as "Corporation,"

It is clear from the agreement that it was

never intended that the stock traded by Royal for the assets of
the Evans Companies would be held for the purposes of payment
to creditors or for a further sale or investment by the Evans
Companies to perpetuate those companies0

The agreement clearly

shows that

The stock was to be

the contrary was required.
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immediately given to the stockholders and the companies liquidatedo

Under such a state of facts, it is difficult to under-

stand how such an arrangement can be anything but a merger
agreement.

Certainly, in substance, that is exactly what was

brought about by the agreement,,
In 19 AraJur 2d, page 923

(Corporations), Section 1546,

it is stated:
"There are certain instances, however, in which
the purchaser or transferee may become liable
for the obligations of the transferor corporationD The transferee may be held liable for
the debts of the transferor corporation: (1)
where there is an express or implied assumption
of liability; o 0 . 0 n (Emphasis supplied0)
Surely, the Agreement of Acquisition contemplates both an
express and an implied assumption of all obligations other than
those specifically excluded by the agreemento

Provisions were

made in the Agreement to accommodate claims that may have been
overlooked as apparently was the Mullins claim0
Mr 0 Evans testified at the time of trial that his companies
were, after the merger agreement, virtually non-existent companiesc
(R 964 0 )

He also testified that he was not allowed to use the

corporate names in the future and that by virtue of the agreement
with Royal, there was nothing left of his companies by a shello
(R 966.)

He was asked:

•

.

•

•

'

.

-

.

16
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,f

Q0

lf

A0

Was there anything withheld by the Rc M 0
Evans Corporation other than the corporate
name when it sold to Royal Industries?
Noo11

(R 711.)

The merger agreement further contemplated an immediate
dissolution of the Evans Companies as is evidenced by Article X
on page 29 of Exhibit D-45, wherein it states:
n

All covenants, agreements, representations
and warranties made hereunder and in any certificate delivered at closing pursuant hereto
shall be deemed to have been relied upon by
Royal and by Corporation (Evans Companies) and
shall survive the execution of this agreement,
the closing, the liquidation or dissolution of
Corporation, and any investigation that either
party or any of its agents or employees may
have made prior to the closingo11 (Emphasis
suppliedo)
The liquidation of a corporation is generally deemed in

law to be the winding up of its affairs0

See 19 AmJur 2d,

Corporations, Page 953, Section 15860
It appears obvious from Exhibit D-45 that all parties to
the acquisition considered that the Evans Companies were to be
immediately liquidated or dissolvedo

A case in point, which

demonstrates the futility of reviewing the evidence as to form
rather than substance, is Stanley Knapp, Jr. vs 0 North American
Rockwell Corporation, CCA 3rd (1974), 506 Fed, 2d 361*

In the

Knapp case, the facts of acquisition of the corporation by
defendant, North American Rockwell, were very similar to those
in the instant case.

The agreement in many ways was almost
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identical in terminologyo

It was claimed by defendant, Rockwell,

that because it was a purchase of certain liabilities as well as
assets that any tort obligations not known at the time could not
be imposed upon the successor corporation0

The Third Circuit

Court of Appeals stated as follows:
"Denying Knapp the right to sue Rockwell because of
the barren continuation of TMW after the exchange
with Rockwell would allow a formality to defeat
Knappfs recoveryc Although TMW technically
existed as an independent corporation, it had no
substanceD The parties clearly contemplated that
TMW would terminate its existence as a part of the
transactionQ TMW had, in exchange for Rockwell
stock, disposed of all of the assets it originally
held, exclusive of the cash necessary to consummate
the transaction. It could not undertake any active
operationso Nor was TMW permitted under the agreement to divest itself of the Rockwell stock, so
that it might become an effective investment vehicle
for its shelters. Most significantly, TMW was
required by the contract with Rockwell to dissolve
f
as soon as practicable.f
ff

0n the other hand, Rockwell acquired all the assets
of TMW, exclusive of certain real estate that
Rockwell did not want, and assumed practically all
of TMWfs liabilitieso Further, Rockwell required
that TMW use its fbest efforts,1 prior to the consummation of the transaction, to preserve TMWfs
business organization intact for Rockwell, to make
available to Rockwell TMWfs existing officers and
employees, and to maintain TMWfs relationship with
its customers and suppliers0 After the exchange,
Rockwell continued TMW's former business operations.

ff

If we are to follow the philosopy of the Pennsylvania
courts that questions of an injured partyfs right
to seek recovery are to be resolved by the analysis
of public policy considerations rather than by a
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mere procrustean application of formalities, we
must, in considering whether the TMW-Rockwell
exchange was a merger, evaluate the public policy
implications of that determination0ff
The main opinion of the Circuit Court then went on to hold
that the substance of the agreement was in effect a merger and
therefore, the plaintiff did have a standing in court to sueD
The concurring opinion filed by one of the judges of the Circuit
Court further sets forth the conclusions to be drawn from such
facts as we have in our instant case as follows:
ff

I believe that, where a corporation purchases
substantially all of the assets of a second
corporation, the legislature intended to impose
the second corporation's tort liabilities on
the acquiring corporation at least if the
following attributes of merger are present:
(1) an ongoing business, including its name
and good will, is transferred to the acquiring
corporation; and (2) the corporation whose assets
are acquired is dissolved after distribution to
its shareholders of the consideration received
from the acquiring corporation

"In the present case, TMW transferred to Rockwell
almost all of its assets, retaining only its
corporate records and a limited amount of cash,
to effectuate the transaction,
,lf

The agreement and plan of reorganization1 specifically provided for the transfer of TMWfs business
f
as a going concern,1 including good will, exclusive right to use the name ftextile machine works1
and the fpermits or licenses to conduct business
as now carried on.1 TMW also agreed to change its
name and dissolvec In this regard, the agreement
and plan of reorganization provided that fon the
closing date, TMW shall take all action required

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to change its name to TW Company 0..0 as soon as
practical after the last liquidating distributions
to its shareholders of Rockwell stock, TMW shall
wind up its affairs and dissolve... flf (Emphasis
suppliedo)
The Court further went on to state in the concurring opinion:
"In addition, this transaction has another characteristic of a statutory merger0 The consideration
given for TMWfs assets was Rockwell stock which
in turn was to be distributed to TMW shareholders
on TMWfs liquidation and dissolution. Thus, TMW
shareholders became shareholders fin Rockwell just
as if they had exchanged their shares directly with
Rockwell under the statutory merger procedure0f
ff

0n the basis of the foregoing, I am persuaded that
the Pennsylvania courts would consider this transaction a merger within the intentment of section
803o This I believe they would do even though the
transaction was structured as a sale and even
though TMW had not fully wound up its affairs and
dissolved until eighteen months after the culmination. TMW actually had ceased to function as a
going concern when the sale was consummated0 Only
a corporate shell remained, engaged solely in the
process of winding up and dissolution.

"While I recognize the rightful prerogative of a
corporation to rearrange its business or go out
of business entirely, there is also a practical
and reasonable basis for construing this transaction as a mergence.ff
The judge then concluded:
,f

I realize that the acquiring corporation was not a
party to any tortious act and had no connection
with the acquiring corporation at the time the
alleged defective product was manufactured,,11

The concurring opinion then agreed that the judgment in favor of
(
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the defendant should be reversed0

The fact that Mullins claim

herein is based upon a contract right as opposed to a tort
obligation would appear to have no basis for distinctionD
CONCLUSION
This Courtfs opinion in the instant case effectively
points out by its reasoning the impossibility of enforcing the
i

Mullins agreement under any circumstances.

The Court first says

that any claim, if there be one against anyone, should have been
against the Evans Companies but in the next breath, it says that
if the Evans Companies do not make any additional machines,
there is no claim0

This would make a suit against the Evans

Companies worthless since they apparently made no more machines
but sold all of the rights to Royal0

The Court then states

that unless there is some sort of recording so that Royal would
be aware of the Mullins1 interest in the machines, it would not
be bound and he would be in the position of an unsecured
creditor holding an imrecorded chattel mortgage.

In the instant

case, there is no way known to the undersigned by which Mullins
could have recorded anything to protecthis rights0
rely upon the law and the facts to protect him0

He must

If the Court

is going to allow the defendants, by their evidence, to conclude
that Mullins really was not serious in making a claim and
therefore, deprive Mullins of his claim unilaterally, it then
appears that the only possibility that Mullins had to protect his
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right would have been to give actual notice to Royal0
culty with this position is obvious, however.

The diffi-

Mullins had no

knowledge of the corporate acquisition taking place until long
after it had been concludedo

At this point in time, if the

Courtfs logic is followed, the door was closed on Mullins because
an innocent purchaser for value could not be held liable0
i

i

One might then ask, could not Mullins have pursued the
assets by way of Royalfs stock which was given for the merger
directly to the stockholders for his reliefo

The difficulty with

that argument would also be that as the Court pointed out in its
opinion, since Evans Companies made no more machines, there
would be nothing by way of damage and again Mullins1 suit would
have been to no avail.
If the Courtfs opinion is taken literally, namely, that
Mullins could only claim the fruits of his contract as against
machines made by the Evans Companies, then it appears obvious
that the agreement could easily be circumvented by a transfer
to a third partyc

Such a conclusion would be tantamount to a

breach of agreement without a remedy0

It would permit anyone

to relieve himself of a contractual obligation merely by conveying the subject of the contract to third parties. Admittedly,
however, if third parties were willing to concede they knew and
had actual knowledge of such a transfer, they may be held liable,
but who would be willing to admit such a fact if not forced to
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do so.

Proof of actual knowledge in many instances would be vir-

tually impossible.

In spite of this, however, there still remains

one other problem.

There are no recording acts of any nature known

to the undersigned whereby Mullins could have preserved any rights
by giving constructive notice by recording.

In other words, by

virtue of the Courtfs opinion, he is left without a remedy under
any view of the facts.
With all due respect to the Courtfs opinion and this
Honorable Court, it appears to the undersigned that a gross injustice is being perpetrated upon the respondent herein.

The opinion

allows the Evans Companies to unilaterally claim they thought the
agreement had been terminated by mutual consent when, in fact,
the jury found to the contrary.

The problem is further compounded

by stating that although Royal received all of the benefits of the
machine and Mullins1 efforts, it could still avoid any consequences
of the agreement by merely stating it had no knowledge of the same,
even though its own merger agreement, which it prepared, provides
for compensation for claims which might have been overlooked.
Whether or not Royal had actual knowledge of the agreement between
Evans and Mullins is not really material0

The Court concedes that

reason to know of this agreement was sufficient to impose liability.
It is respectfully submitted that the records of the Evans Companies
which were reviewed from the inception of the Companies to the date
of the merger agreement, were clearly available for inspection and
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should have imparted knowledge to anyone checking the records0
It seems totally inequitable to allow Royal to escape responsibility by having Evans testify that he personally thought the
agreement had been terminated because of his own unilateral contract, and contrary to the jury's findings0

The unilateral

decision by Evans to breach his companies1 agreement with Mullins
should not be permitted as a basis for the Courtfs decisionG

No

substantive distinction can be drawn between agreement of acquisition as evidenced by Exhibit D-45 and a clear-cut statutory
merger other than the tax resultsD

Clearly, the form of the

agreement between the parties herein amounted to a merger, at
least a de facto merger.

As was pointed out in Knapp, supra,

where the ongoing business, including its name and good will, is
transferred to the acquiring corporation; and to the corporation
whose assets are acquired is dissolved after distribution to its
shareholders of the consideration received from the acquiring
corporation, this does in fact constitute a mergerG

The Court's

decision should be reconsidered and reversed, and the judgment
and verdict of the trial court reinstated,,
Respectfully Submitted,
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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